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Abstract—As modern vehicle and communication technolo-
gies advanced apace, people begin to believe that Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS) would be achievable in one decade.
ITS introduces information technology to the transportation
infrastructures and aims to improve road safety and traffic
efficiency. However, security is still a main concern in Vehicular
Communication Systems (VCS). This can be addressed through
secured group broadcast. Therefore, secure key management
schemes are considered as a critical technique for network
security. In this paper, we propose a framework for providing
secure key management within the heterogeneous network. The
security managers (SMs) play a key role in the framework by
capturing the vehicle departure information, encapsulating block
to transport keys and then executing rekeying to vehicles within
the same security domain. The first part of this framework is
a novel network topology based on a decentralised blockchain
structure. The blockchain concept is proposed to simplify the
distributed key management in heterogeneous VCS domains.
The second part of the framework uses the dynamic transaction
collection period to further reduce the key transfer time during
vehicles handover. Extensive simulations and analysis show the
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed framework, in which
the blockchain structure performs better in term of key transfer
time than the structure with a central manager, while the dynamic
scheme allows SMs to flexibly fit various traffic levels.
Index Terms—Dynamic Key Management, Blockchain, han-
dover, VCS, ITS
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBER-PHYSICAL System (CPS) is considered as oneof the most potential techniques to bring a better life
to human beings. One of the most attractive CPS scenarios
is the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Vehicles and
ITS infrastructures play the role of physical units, while
the Vehicular Communication Systems (VCS) is the network
platform of ITS. VCS supports not only message exchange
among vehicles, but also between vehicles and infrastructures
as well. Infrastructure access points in VCS are called Road
Side Units (RSUs) [1]. RSUs act as a base station in VCS
and covers a dedicated section of the road. Traditional VCS is
comprised of multiple RSU cells and offers a platform among
ITS for vehicles to exchange various kinds of messages such
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as safety notification message. With the help of VCS, ITS
can offer safer and efficient traffic management. Moreover,
commercial applications, such as electric vehicle charging [2],
image recognition for license plates, location based service
information and dynamic scene to assist vehicle navigation [3],
can be implemented on a dedicated platform. A recent report
from U.S Department of Transport (DoT) shows that 82% of
the accidents can be prevented by using ITS systems [4]. Even
though significant developments have taken place over the
past few years in the area of VCS, security issues, especially
key management schemes are still an open topic for research
[5] [6]. High mobility, large volume, frequent handoffs of
vehicular nodes and heterogeneity networks pose different
challenges compared to the traditional mobile networks.
VCS applications are classified into Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) [7] and its security
highly relies on the exchange of safety beacon messages.
These beacon messages are usually referred to as Cooperative
Awareness Messages (CAMs) in Europe [8] or Basic Safety
Messages (BSMs) for US [9], as they enable other vehicles to
be aware of their surroundings. Vehicles located in the same
RSU cell form a group and the current traffic situation is
generated based on the summary of BSM broadcast from other
group members [10]. The trustfulness and legality of BSM
information are proved by encrypting safety messages with
a pre-agreed Group Key (GK). For this reason, the problem
of providing ITS security can be mapped into the problem
of how to reliably distribute or update group keys among
all the communicating participants. Several approaches were
developed to improve the efficiency of managing keys for
groups. Key Tree Approaches [11] [12] were developed to ease
the problem. Furthermore, Batch Rekeying (BR) [13] [14] [15]
was proposed to significantly improve efficiency compared to
individual rekeying schemes. But these approaches are not
suitable for VCS application as the number of mobile nodes
may be very large in VCS.
Aside from the aforementioned problem, it is critical to
make sure the cryptographic materials can be timely delivered
to the Security Manager (SM) in a new security domain.
Moreover, GK has to be refreshed and redistributed (rekeying)
securely whenever group member changes in order to achieve
forward and backward secrecy [16]. This approach poses chal-
lenges of rekeying efficiency, especially in the heterogeneous
network. Heterogeneity in wireless network refers to either the
difference on the traffic volumes, or distinct network structures
[17]. The heterogeneous networks structures normally stand
for the networks managed under different topologies or central
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managers [18] [19]. Recently, heterogeneous VCSs are given
more attention. The heterogeneity in terms of different central
managers has become a real problem as VCS is considered as
a worldwide system covering multiple countries. Specifically
speaking, SM should timely deliver a vehicle’s cryptographic
materials to the neighbour SM when the car passes the cross-
domain border.
With this in mind, blockchain [20] is considered as a feasi-
ble tool to achieve the goal. Blockchain is a synchronised and
distributed ledger which stores a list of blocks. Blocks record
user information and a receipt to link to the previous block.
Central managers are removed from the blockchain structure
and the public ledger is maintained by all the network partic-
ipants instead. Messages are broadcasted into the network for
nodes to authenticate. A new block is attached to the ledger
if the messages pass the authentication process. With the help
with this simplified structure, information propagation between
security domains can be accelerated since the information is
directly sent to the destination rather than passing the messages
through central managers. Moreover, the distributed structure
of blockchain network performs better robustness under the
single point of failure.
In this paper, we propose a key management scheme
for VCS scenario, including the key transfer between two
heterogeneous networks and the dynamic key management
scheme to decrease the key transfer time. A novel blockchain
concept is introduced into the proposed scheme to simplify the
key transfer handshake procedure in order to achieve better
efficiency. In the blockchain based scheme, we removed the
third-party authorities (central managers) and the key transfer
processes are verified and authenticated by the SM network.
The record of these processes (mined blocks) is shared within
the network for SMs to create public ledgers. Furthermore, the
transaction collection period is able to dynamically change
with respect to various traffic levels. The time consumption
result of heterogeneous key management is compared with
that in the traditional network structure to evaluate the perfor-
mances of our blockchain based scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II briefly introduces key management techniques. Model
overview and details of our scheme are discussed in section
III. We describe our system model, including blockchain
algorithms, key transfer between heterogeneous networks and
dynamic transaction collection periods. Scenario is set up for
performance evaluation in Section IV. Section V concludes
the paper and presents some future plans.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the overview of the characteristics
of any related schemes in this section, a brief literature review
about CPS, bitcoin, blockchain applications and VCS key
management is introduced afterwards.
A. Cyber-Physical System
In Cyber-Physical System, components are classified into
physical part and software part [21]. Physical components
include infrastructures, network sensors and computation de-
vices. Software components contain programme, software op-
eration systems and the IoT environment. CPS has various
use cases, including ITS, smart grid, smart meters, smart
medical systems, smart cities, etc. These use cases assist
living, improve safety and release traffic jam. However, chal-
lenges hide in the positive impact of CPS. Major challenges
about CPS have been conducted in enhancing the security
and privacy, as well as network efficiency [22] [23]. For
instance, wireless sensor network is a well known CPS use
case. It requires security scheme to maintain both efficient
secret key distribution and low energy consumption [24]. A
cutting-edge CPS scenario is described in paper [25]. The
paper proposes a solution in vehicular fog-computing services
(vehicular CPS). The fog-computing follows the distribution
structure and distributes the heavy computation tasks to the
infrastructures, instead of central manager. Paper [25] enables
a smart resource management to optimise the communication-
plus-computing energy efficiency in order to achieve the best
QoS requirement. A more applicable fog-computing-based
CPS system is discussed in [26]. The paper developed a
framework to optimise TCP/IP virtualised data centres, the dy-
namic scheduler and the dynamic queue system are taken into
consideration. The dynamic approach not only maximise the
average workload admitted by the data centre, but also min-
imise the resulting network-plus-computing average energy
consumption. However, both the above schemes only cover
the network efficiency issue, but not consider the security and
privacy vulnerabilities.
B. Blockchain and Security Analysis
A lot of attention has been attracted to the blockchain
concept since its parent production, bitcoin, was launched
in late 2008 [20]. The core idea of blockchain is that it
maintains a distributed, authenticated and synchronised ledger
of transactions. Without the administration from the central
manager, network nodes denote their processing power to
proofread transactions. The authenticated transactions are writ-
ten into the public ledger in the form of blocks. Accountability
function is benefited by using block look-up, which helps to
timely revoke the cryptographic materials of malicious users.
Another issue of blockchain approach is the use of transactions
which conveys information among the distributed network
and can hence send messages using peer-to-peer mode [27].
More importantly, network participants (miners) contribute
their processing power to verify information correctness and
integrity in blockchain network [27].
Two characteristics are always mentioned along with
blockchain: distributed and decentralised. The distributed char-
acteristic means that the network structure follows mesh or
P2P topologies. Decentralisation mainly refers to the manage-
ment mode of blockchain network. However the core principle
in blockchain is decentralisation. The centralised network de-
pends on a network manager to prevent malicious behaviours.
As a result, centralised managers take too much communica-
tion and computation burden. Furthermore, the whole network
suffers from disconnection if the central manager is under
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attack. Decentralisation management networks, on the other
hand, distribute the responsibility and control permissions
between the user nodes. Security and privacy of the network
are based on the proof-of-work [28]. Due to the nature of
distributed computation, the network has better robustness
to against network failure caused by nodes disconnection.
Although the 51% attack [28] still plays a potential problem
for blockchain applications, holding a majority of the total
network’s processing power is highly unlikely. It’s uneconomic
for individual attackers to employ a powerful system like ITS.
Paper [29] precisely analysed the security threats to blockchain
system.
C. Blockchain Applications
Most of the contributions using blockchain are devoted to
optimise decentralised currency models. Authors in [30] pre-
sented a new cryptocurrency. Basing on the concept of bitcoin,
the new cryptocurrency improves scalability and flexibility of
cryptocurrencies.
Despite the fact that there is no other work about using
blockchain in VCS, blockchain architectures in some contribu-
tions are still valuable for reference. Paper [31] proposed to use
blockchain to build a decentralised system to manage personal
data. Authors design two types of un-financial transactions
which are assumed to access data in blockchain and write data
into the ledger, respectively. The access control of personal
data is monitored by blockchain. An access transaction is sent
when a user tries to access the database for storage or retrieval
of data. After the access transaction is approved, the user needs
to describe their requirements in data transaction in order to
finish the communication between blockchain. However, au-
thors in [31] didn’t consider overhead and efficiency problems.
Since IoT aims to seamlessly fit into CPS, for maximising
adoption by users and infrastructures. It is critical to compress
the overhead and efficiently manage the increasing number
of node identity materials [32]. The authors in [33] focus
on a cutting-edge secure transaction exchange system using
blockchain for decentralised energy trading in another CPS,
smart grids. They address the scalability, security and privacy
problems of the centralised system. The security issues are
analysed with reference to the processing time to different
cryptographic schemes. However the analysis is not based
on the network performance. Contribution in [33] involves
another blockchain-CPS research focusing on smart medi-
cal systems. Wireless nodes and sensors play the role of
blockchain miners. Miners in this approach can get access to
anonymised medical data as rewards, in return for their mining
work to maintain the blockchain. Both patients and the health
care staffs are given accessible and credible electronic medical
records.
D. Our Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, our previous work [34] is the
first time the technology has been used in VCS applications. In
[34], the SM network was used to transfer and verify vehicle
keys in the across border requests, rather than forwarding them
to the third party authorities. The time consumption result
of heterogeneous key management is compared with that in
the traditional network structure to prove that the blockchain
concept helps to shorten the key transfer time. However, it
didn’t take the information proofreading time into considera-
tion. Moreover, it was apparent that our previous result did
not consider dynamic elements in VCS. For example, the
transaction collection periods should keep the same pace with
various vehicle rekeying periods.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. System Model
We focus exclusively on a system of ITS infrastructures
each equipped with a device embedded with wireless com-
munication module based on the IEEE 802.11p standard.
Meanwhile, vehicles are required to have a built-in On Board
Unit (OBU) to support the IEEE 802.11p standard. Vehicles
travel on a road and periodically transmit safety messages
using the transmitter in the OBU, which are collected by
infrastructures that are built along the road at regular inter-
vals. Safety message includes movement information, such as
speed, orientation, position and vehicle size. The infrastruc-
tures relay messages between vehicles and SMs which are
placed on the upper level of VCS. Each SM has their own
logical coverage area which is called security domain.
Fig. 1. Traditional network structure [35]
1) Network Hierarchy: VCS networks normally have four
layers. Three layers on the side of service providers, while
the user side occupies a single layer [35]. As shown in Fig.1,
layers on the service providers’ side, namely, RSUs, SMs
and Central Managers. RSUs act as IEEE 802.11p access
points (AP) which offer an interface to route messages from
vehicles to upper-level managers. RSUs are built along the
road at regular intervals in order to provide maximum network
coverage. SMs are placed at the second layer which manages
cryptography materials of different security domains. It is
proposed to install SMs in a geographically sparse manner, one
for each security domain. Central managers rule the network
on the first(top) layer, they are also known as Certificate
Authorities (CAs). Vehicles’ permanent identities, certificates,
pseudonyms are calculated and authenticated at CA to issue
legal identities using in VCS.
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Fig. 2. Network structures (a) Traditional structure with the third-party authorities (b) Blockchain structure without the third-party authorities
2) Traditional Structure: Traditional structure strictly fol-
lows the aforementioned hierarchy. As shown in Fig.2(a),
Security Domain A is an area which is managed by SM-A. cer-
tificate authorities (CAs) take the role of central managers at
the top level. Several SMs are managed by CA.This traditional
network structure employs CA or trusted third party authority
at the top of the network to manage cryptography materials,
this however makes it an inefficient key exchange, and will
require several several handshakes if a car passes from one
security domain to another. When a vehicle attempts to join a
new geographic region in which infrastructures are managed
by a new CA, the Previous SM-A (Previous SM) picks up
this border crossing activity from the beacon messages that
are sent by the vehicle. Then it generates a border crossing
request along with useful information related to the vehicle
and forwards all these materials to the CA-A (Previous CA).
The request will be forwarded to the CA-B (New CA) if it
has passed the verification steps. CA-B will inform SM-B
(New SM) about the border crossing activity with necessary
cryptography materials, before it checks the correctness of the
request. Rekeying procedures will be triggered in the new area
after new SM has received such cryptography materials.
3) Blockchain based structure: The above procedures in
traditional network delay the key transfer between two security
domains. Different to the traditional structure, the functions of
the central manager on the top level are merged into SM in
blockchain based structure. In this case, SM takes over the role
of the network manager. As presents in Fig.2(b), central Man-
ager is placed in an isolated environment, acting as a facility
to store and generate vehicle cryptographic materials. Crypto-
graphic materials, such as vehicle identities, pseudonyms and
pseudonym certificates, are supposed to be kept in a dedicated
facility to cope with the privacy and security purposes [36].
Thus central managers are accessed under the following three
situations. (i) Initial registration. New vehicles need to apply
for the initial registration when they leave the manufacturer
and first participate in a new security domain. (ii) Change
the identity-related information. Vehicles must to periodically
change their pseudonym set, as well as all the cryptographic
materials related to this pseudonym. Thus they need to contact
the central manager to generate a new set of cryptographic
identity for them. (iii) Adversary revocation. In the blockchain
based structure, malicious behaviours are recognised by using
blockchain look-up. Identity (including pseudonyms) of the
adversary is publicised once the malicious behaviours have
been confirmed.
Similar to the bitcoin network, the function of blockchain
enables nodes to share information without the need for a
central party to secure this ledger. SM is connected with an
SM group that may link with SMs on other domains and
certification entities with a domain. Similar to the bitcoin ap-
plications, the information in safety messages are encapsulated
into transactions if they indicate an SM-border-crossing action.
Transactions are shared with neighbour SMs to transport keys.
Aside from this, the SMs take the role of miners which forms
transaction within a period of time into a block. As a reward,
miners are allowed to get their block authenticated by the SM
network. Our proposal is to transport keys by mining blocks
so that a blockchain can be maintained for heterogeneous key
management purpose, at least within a local SM domain. As
a result, the keys of new joining members is delivered by
retrieving the information from the block.
B. Heterogeneous key management
We introduce the blockchain concept in this section,
which aims to simplify the distributed key management in
large heterogeneous security domains. Blockchain helps to
achieve a lightweight and scalable key transfer scheme. The
conventional multi-server handover steps are illustrated before
the blockchain idea is demonstrated.
1) Key Transmission Handshake: The cross domains hand-
shake steps are discussed in [37] [38] to guarantee efficiency
and security. The handover steps were studied under mobile
multi-server networks. The scenario involves five entities:
Mobile Nodes (MN), Home Agent (HA), Foreign Agent
(FA), Authentication Server (AS) and RSUs. The schemes
assume that all the MU had registered with AS to obtain the
cryptographic materials. The MU sends a request message to
sign into FA upon joining the foreign domain. The request is
received by RSU, verified and forwarded to FA afterwards.
The handover is triggered by FA. Before building connection
with MU, FA must authenticate the unfamiliar node through
HA. Two handshakes will be established between FA and HA
before MU is proved as a legal user of HA. Finally, FA will
issue a new set of cryptographic materials to MU.
The typical handover steps in [37] [38] are designed basing
on the unpredictable node movement trajectories. However,
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Fig. 3. Key transfer handshake procedures in cross-domain traditional structure
vehicle movement trajectories are easily predicted due to the
fact that the current RSU knows all the driving trends of vehi-
cles under its coverage area. For this reason, the conventional
handover steps can be triggered by the HA instead of FA. In
the VCS traditional structure, we assume the SMs take the
job of HA and FA and RSUs only for improving coverage
area. Additionally, malicious behaviours in VCS can easily
endanger human life, it requires a top level security to deliver
trusted service. The requirement is fulfilled by equipping
server who supervises user data. Thus, the handshakes between
SMs are checked by CA in a mandatory manner.
The cross domains handshake process in the traditional
network is shown in Fig.3. The network set a collection
period based on the traffic level. SM-A (previous SM) picks
up all the border crossing activities from beacon messages
within this transaction period. These border crossing activities
are formed into individual transactions. SM-A sends these
transactions one by one to CA-A (previous CA) to proof.
To ensure security, proof work should verify the signature to
check authentication and message integrity. The ciphertext will
be decrypted using CA-A’s private key and re-encrypted using
CA-B’s public key. That’s because the original ciphertext is
secured using CA-A’s public key and CA-B doesn’t have the
corresponding key to decrypt. During the proofreading, the
proved transactions are translated into a new version which is
readable by CA-B (next CA). CA-B repeats the proof steps
after receiving the transaction packet and convert them into
SM-B readable version. Finally, all the cross-border requests
arrive at SM-B, packing in transaction packet. A handshake
message flow is shown below with details. Where En{∗}
stands for the encryption activities using ECIES scheme [39],
Sig{∗} is the signing conducts using ECDSA scheme [40].
PK∗ and SK∗ are elliptic curve based public and private key
pairs, respectively.
1. SM-A sends transactions to CA-A :
En{info}PKCA-A + destSM + Sig{Cipher + destSM}SKSM-A
2. CA-A forwards the transaction packet to CA-B :
En{info}PKCA-B + destSM + Sig{Cipher + destSM}SKCA-A
3. CA-B forwards the transaction packet to SM-B :
En{info}PKSM-B + destSM + Sig{Cipher + destSM}SKCA-B
The handshake steps are reduced if SMs are located in
Fig. 4. Key transfer handshake procedures in same-domain traditional
structure
the same security domain. SM-A-1 forwards transactions to
CA-A to proof. Under this structure, both SMs are under
managed by the same CA. Therefore there is no need to
translate transactions into another version which is dedicated
to other CAs. Similar to the cross domain version, SM-A-2
receives transactions from transaction packet in the end. The
aforementioned steps are presented in Fig.4.
1. SM-A-1 sends transactions to CA-A :
En{info}PKCA-A + destSM + Sig{Cipher + destSM}SKSM-A
2. CA-A forwards the transaction packet to SM-A-2 :
En{info}PKSM-A-2 + destSM + Sig{Cipher + destSM}SKCA-A
Fig. 5. Key transfer handshake procedures in blockchain structure
The key transportation handshake could thus be simplified
by using blockchain mining method, meaning the messages
will be verified by SM network but not third party authorities.
The blockchain structure removes CAs and nodes supervising
each other by mining the blocks and broadcasting the results.
A simplified handshake graph is shown in Fig.5. Collection
period allows several transactions to be broadcasted into SM
network and picked up by SMs in the network. Signatures
in transactions are processed to verify if the information
in transactions is trustworthy. Ciphertext in transactions is
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kept from decryption until they reach the destination SM
since the ciphertext is encrypted using the public key of the
destination SM. According to the nature of blockchain mining,
transactions are inserted into the block in random order. Last
but not least, the above block will be mined using mining
algorithm and the mined block will be broadcasted back to
the network. The above procedures are presented as follows:
1. SM-A sends transactions to SM-Cloud :
En{info}PKSM-dest + destSM + Sig{Cipher + destSM}SKSM-A
2. SM-Cloud returns the mined block to SM-A :
2) Transaction format: Transactions are designed to encap-
sulate key transfer materials from the source SM to destination
SM. Six fields are contained in the transaction header of
our model (Table.I) [34]. The transaction number shows the
position of this transaction in the transaction packet. Current
and destination SM number are equivalent to bitcoin input
and output, respectively [20]. The identity materials including
the current vehicle pseudonym and certificate, are encrypted
using the public key of the destination SM. The signature
occupies the last position of the transaction to maintain the
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation of key transfer
information.
TABLE I
THE FORMAT OF TRANSACTION
Transaction Header
Hashed result of the transaction
Number of this transaction in block
Current security domain number SM-this
Destination security domain number SM-dest
Vehicle identity materials
including the encrypted vehicle pseudonym and certificate
Signature of this transaction to ensure integrity and authentication
Sig{Cipher + destSM}SKSM-this
Payload: (Encrypted Transaction Information)
Cipher = En{info}PKSM-dest
Here info is the identity materials in the transaction.
Privacy-related information is encrypted into ciphertext
En{info}PK-dest using destination SM’s public key PKdest.
Signature is computed using both ciphertext and the number of
destination SM, signed using source SM’s private key SKthis.
To keep the confidentiality of the information in
transactions, identity materials are encrypted using destination
SM’s public key. As a result, the information stays unreadable
to the SM network expect the destination SM. Encrypted
privacy related information combined with digitally signed
transaction contents ensure that an adversary cannot act as a
normal node, or amend and eavesdrop cross-domain requests,
as that would require the adversary to forge a signature.
Simultaneously, other SMs are able to exam if this transaction
is legitimate or not. Similarly, a malicious user cannot read
anything from the encrypted message, as only the destination
SM has the key to decrypt the message.
3) Block format: The block header is constructed by six
fields (Table.II), similar to the bitcoin block [34]. The second
field links the block to its parent block. This field helps
blocks linking to each and creating a chain structure. All the
transactions in the block are merged into the merkle tree root
[41]. Merkle tree root assures the integrity of transactions as
the alteration on transactions causes a totally different value of
merkle root value. Time tampering is prevented by checking
the timestamp field. A target mining solution is a 256-bit
number with number of zeros nzeros at the start of the hash
result of the block header [33]. The number nzeros is the
targeted difficulty. SM collects all transactions within a certain
period (transaction collection period) of time and inserts these
transactions in arbitrary order into a block. In this way, blocks
are able to aggregate multiple cross-border requests.
TABLE II
THE FORMAT OF BLOCK
Block Header
Field Description
Version Block Version Number
Previous Block Hash Hash of the previous block in the chain
Merkle Tree Root Hash of the merkle tree root RootM
Timestamp Creation time of this block
Targeted Difficulty The Proof-Of-Work difficulty target
Nonce A counter for the Proof-Of-Work
Block Payload (Transactions)
Transaction No.1 · · · Transaction No.n
The payload of a block is comprised of transactions that
SMs collect within the transaction collection period, denoted
by tCP. These transactions are packed into the same block. The
theoretical number of transactions is decided by tCP and the
number of passing vehicles in each hour (nH). An expression
of nT is shown in the following equation.
number of transactions =
nH
3600s/hour
× tCP (1)
4) Mining and Proof algorithm: In blockchain, proof-of-
work is a digital receipt which is hard to calculate but easy for
others to verify [20]. A one-way cryptographic hash function,
double SHA256, dhash(), is used to calculate the proof-of-
work. Where the double SHA256 is calculated as follows:
hashed result = dhash(input) = SHA256(SHA256(input))
The hash of the block header is calculated by SMs. This
candidate block header is hashed repeatedly using different
nonce value until the resulting hash value starts with the
numbers of zeros (matches the difficulty requirement). As we
mentioned in the block format section, the transactions are
placed in block payload in random order. The reason that
we using this approach is because it forces different SMs
having different mining time. The random order provides an
extent of stochasticity, leading to distinct header hash results.
To be more precisely, different header hash results make
SMs mining same sets of the transaction in different time
lengths. Therefore, block conflicts are prevented in advance.
Algorithm.1 shows a summarised pseudocode of mining pro-
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cedure. Algorithm.2 gives a detailed overview of necessary
procedures for proofing a mined block.
Algorithm 1 Calculate Nonce (Proof-Of-Work)
Input: : Information to create Candidate Block Header H: Block Version VB ,
Previous Block Hash Hashprev, Timestamp tnow, difficulty number d and
transactions Trans = [T1, T2...Tn]
Output: : Nonce value nonce
1: Initialise bool variable gotAns = FALSE;
2: while (NOR gotAns) do
3: The transaction order arand = randPerm(n)
by permuting integers within range [1, n];
4: Calculate Merkle tree root RootM basing on arand;
5: Create the hashed block header Htemp
Where Htemp = VB ||Hashprev||RootM ||tnow||d;
6: Initialise tries number nonce = 0; Hash output result;
7: while (NOR gotAns & NOT got Proof-Of-Work from network) do
8: result = dhash(Htemp||nonce);
9: nonce ++ ;
10: if (result has at least d padding zeros in front & NOT got
11: Proof-Of-Work from network ) then
12: Write (nonce - 1) into nonce field;
13: gotAns = TRUE;
14: return (nonce - 1);
15: else if (receive Proof-Of-Work from Network) then
16: gotAns = TRUE;
17: return NULL;
18: end if
19: end while
20: end while
21: End Algorithm
Algorithm 2 Proof the Block
Input: : Mined Block Header Hmined; Block payload Bpayload
Output: : Bool variable isCorrect
1: Extract nonce value: nonce = getNonce( Hmined );
2: Calculate Merkle Tree Root RootM basing on the transactions in Bpayload;
3: Create header: Hverify = VB ||Hashprev||RootM ||tnow||d;
4: The string to verify: Inputverify = Hverify||nonce;
5: Calculate the hashed value of the string: result = dhash( Inputverify );
6: if (result has at least d padding zeros in front) then
7: isCorrect = TRUE;
8: else
9: isCorrect = FALSE;
10: end if
11: return isCorrect;
12: End Algorithm
5) Time Composition: Table.III shows all the time ele-
ments that composes the key transfer time. For traditional
structure, all the time variables in tprocessing are taken into ac-
count, while tV is the only one to be considered in blockchain
structure. Message transfer time ttransfer including the informa-
tion propagation time in cable, as well as the random back-off
time in the CSMA protocol. The variable tprep is dedicated
to blockchain applications, containing time cost variables to
create a new block.
As describes above, processing time for three situations
are summarised in Equation(2)-(4). Where nT is the average
number of transactions among a single collection period.
Variable tTC, tTS and tB are processing time of key transfer
procedures in cross-domain traditional structure, same-domain
traditional structure and blockchain structure, respectively.
tTC = nT × (tV + tD + tE + tS)× 2 + (tBO + tP)× 3 (2)
tTS = nT × (tV + tD + tE + tS) + (tBO + tP)× 2 (3)
Equation(2) and (3) describe the time components in the
traditional structure. Due to the fact that CAs in the traditional
structure must verify and translate transactions to the neigh-
bour CAs or SMs. Both situations take all the elements in
tprocessing into calculation. For the cross-domain scenario, the
above processes are designed to be implemented twice.
tB = nT × tV + (tBO + tP)× 2 + tprep + tM (4)
Equation(4) expresses that only signature verification
is required in transaction checking. However, mining time
tM and block preparation steps are attached into overall
processing time in order to extend the blockchain.
6) Dynamic Key Management: Our dynamic key manage-
ment is achieved by using dynamic transaction collection
periods. To decrease the side effect of variables, the method
of control variable is employed in our scheme. We use one
second as the standard metric to measure the performances of
various collection periods. Thus nT-All is a sum up number of
transactions in all the roads. tB-1 is the average processing time
in one second under various collection periods. Basing on the
Equation(1) and (4), we can derive the number of transactions
on nR roads and tB-1 as follows:
nT-All =
traffic amount
3600s/hour
× tCP × nR (5)
tB-1 = [nT-All × tV + (tBO + tP)× 2 + tprep + tM]÷ tCP (6)
Estimated key transfer time is calculated using various col-
lection periods as inputs. The optimised transaction collection
time is selected according to the minimum key transfer time:
argmin
tCP
tB-1 subject to : tCP ∈ [t1CP, tnCP]
To sum up, a transaction collection period optimisation algo-
rithm is demonstrated using pseudo-algorithm in Algorithm.3.
Algorithm 3 Optimise the Transaction Collection Period
Input: : Traffic amount on each road nH, n optional transaction collection
periods (t1CP · · · tnCP)
Output: : Optimised transaction collection period tmCP
1: Initialise a data sink tB-1 = [t1CP · · · tnCP]
2: for (i = 1; i 6 n; i++) do
3: Call Equation(6), calculate tiB-1 when tCP = t
i
CP and traffic amount
on each road is equal to nH;
4: tB-1[i]← tiB-1, record tiB-1 into the result sink;
5: end for
6: tmCP = min(tB-1), Find the minimum key transfer time
7: return tmCP;
8: End Algorithm
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance evaluation of blockchain based key man-
agement scheme was carried out using simulations. Perfor-
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TABLE III
THE TIME ELEMENTS OF PROCESSING PROCEDURES
Parent Field Description of Parent Field Child Field Description of Child Field
tprep
trand Calculation time to generate random transaction sequence
The time cost to prepare block tfill Time cost to insert transactions into the block message
which will be mined later tmerkle Calculation time to get Merkle Tree Root
theader Processing time to prepare block header
ttransfer
Transmission time cost in SM network tBO Average CSMA back-off time
including CSMA back-off time tP Propagation time in network cable
tprocessing
tE Processing time to encrypt plain text (ECIES)
Processing time for message Encryption, tD Processing time to decrypt cipher text (ECIES)
Decryption, Signing and Verification tS Processing time to sign messages (ECDSA)
tV Processing time to verify signature (ECDSA)
mance evaluation is broken into Three parts. The first part
studies the processing time components, namely encryption,
decryption, signing, verification, block mining and block
preparation. The comparison of processing time results be-
tween the blockchain structure and the traditional structure is
demonstrated in the second part. The last part further studies
the processing time in blockchain network against different
transaction collection periods. This section starts with the
simulation assumptions.
A. Simulation Assumptions
Our result is generated using OMNeT++ 4.5 [42] [43]
with the dedicated network simulation (Veins) packet [43].
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) [39]
with elliptic curve secp160r1 in Crypto++ [44] is selected
not only for cryptographic scheme ECIES, but Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as well. Cipher block
has a length of 75 bytes which is because ECIES provides
much better security level. 20 bytes are used to store the cross-
border information in transactions. The difficulty of each block
is set to 3 to maintain efficiency and security. This security
level is enough to secure the network which is due to the fact
that SMs are trusted entities. We simulated that blocks are
mined by our laptop with Intel Core i5 and 8GB RAM and
display card GeForce 920M. This device can complete 250K
hash calculations per second. The performances of first two
parts of simulations focus on the processing time in terms of
transactions. The results depend only on the overall number
of transactions. Thus the simulation setup is compromised the
following steps: (i) At end of each tCP , a certain number of
transactions flooding into the SM network. The movement of
vehicles are not considered in these two parts; (ii) Each SM
records the processing time results of cryptography schemes
and block preparation. The results are records by averaging
the results from SMs; (iii) Transactions ranging from 0 to
200 is set for test cryptographic schemes to get a zoom-in
view of results. Up to 1000 transactions are introduced in
block preparation simulations so that the exponential growth
of results can be demonstrated. Maximum 2000 transactions
are simulated to compare the key transmission time which
aims to test the time value differences between blockchain
and tradition structures.
The third simulation aims to test key transmission time
under different traffic levels and transaction collection periods.
Fig. 6. The assumed topology for blockchain network
Here we assume that the system calculates the overall number
of cross-border activities at end of the collection periods.
The vehicle cross-border activities follow the exponential
distribution. The cross-border events occur rate follows the
quantile function of exponential distribution [45]:
ti = − ln(1 − Pi)
λ
, λ =
1
µ
Where i is the event number, λ is the rate of expected
events, ti is the expected events occurrence time, Pi is the
probability following the normal distribution and µ is the mean
value of the exponential distribution. The upper and the lower
amount of vehicle traffic are considered under a saturated
traffic condition and off-peak traffic of Beijing, which is
considered as one of the most crowded cities in the world. The
off-peak time has 3,000 vehicles per hour, while the saturated
traffic is set to have 15,000 vehicles passing a road in an
hour, aiming to examine our scheme under the worst case as
well as the heaviest burden of VCS. The topology of scenario
in the third part results are assumed in Beijing. There are
eight urban districts, therefore we assume a 3×3 topology. As
shown in Fig.6, each urban district is managed by one SM.
Security domains are connected to each other via two-way
highways. Here we assume each common edge has five two-
way highways to connect to the neighbour security domain.
Thus there are overall 120 highways basing on this topology.
For each SM, tCP is ranged from 0.5 seconds to 1 second in
order to test the performance regarding different transaction
collection length.
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B. Processing Time of Cryptographic Schemes
We first study the processing time cost for cryptographic
schemes. It aims to obtain the data of each elements in
Table.III and further complete the result of Equation(2)-(4).
Fig. 7. Computation time of cryptographic schemes over transaction number
Since the key transfer time needs to consider the com-
putation time of cryptographic schemes. Therefore we sim-
ulated the time cost for different schemes. Fig.7 shows the
performance of different cryptographic schemes which are
used in key transfer procedures. Except for the mining time
cost, the processing time increases linearly with the growth
of transaction number. The mining algorithm always mines
a single header due to the fact that block header is able to
contain multiple transactions. The mining processing time is
an average value of multiple simulations. the practice value
is likely less than this average value due to the network only
accept the fastest mined block. The encryption and decryption
schemes cost similar processing time. Signature verification
costs the longest computation time among schemes. According
to the Equation(2)-(4), signature verification plays a key
component in key transfer time. Table.IV records the average
processing time for each cryptographic schemes.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE CRYPTOGRAPHY PROCESSING TIME
Cryptography Scheme Processing Time (Milliseconds)
ECIES Encryption 0.51027
ECIES Decryption 0.73996
ECDSA Signing 0.51011
ECDSA Verifing 1.10171
Block Mining 4.11046
Fig.8 plots the block preparation time in terms of transaction
number. The preparation time increases exponentially with the
growth of transaction number. The processing time slowly
increases before 300 transactions. Processing time over 0.1
seconds when transaction bigger than 400. Finally, preparation
time reaches 0.95 seconds when there are 1000 transactions.
The non-linear curve is caused by exponentially increasing of
trand, while rest of the preparation time components increase
linearly in proportion to the transaction number.
Fig. 8. Block preparation time with respect to the transaction number
C. Comparison of Blockchain and Traditional Structures
To evaluate the performance of the novel blockchain and
traditional structures, we compare them with the conventional
handover schemes in [37] [38]. We conduct experiments under
two situations: (i) Key transfer between two security domains
which are within the same security division of the district. (ii)
Key transfer between two security domains which separate in
different security divisions of the district. Here the divisions
mean geographical districts monitored by different central
managers.
Fig. 9. Processing time comparison between structures and schemes (a) Time
cost values when hand over within same security domain (b) Time cost values
when hand over across different security domains
Fig.9 depicts the key transfer performances of blockchain
scheme with respect to varying the number of transactions. The
results of schemes in [37] [38] are used as benchmark of the
simulation which aims to show the performance improvement
by using our scheme. Comparison of situation (i) is shown
in the Fig.9(a). All the results have zero processing time
when border across actions does not appear in the network.
It takes approximately 0.8 seconds to finish transfer 500
transactions, while nearly double the time is cost to handle the
same amount of transactions in the traditional structure. The
conventional scheme costs more than triple the key handover
time of blockchain structure. However, two curves have an
intersection at around 1500 transactions due to the exponential
increase of blockchain key transfer time. Although our scheme
cost more processing time due to the growing number of
transactions, our schemes provide better scalability against
the traditional structure when transaction number less than
1500. Additionally, our blockchain based scheme saves nearly
half of the processing time at transaction number equalling to
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1500 and the time results always below the benchmark when
transactions no less than 2000. Similar contradistinction is
demonstrated in the Fig.9(b) to show the result of situation (ii).
CA translates messages from one security domain to another
in the conventional scheme. For the traditional structure in
this situation, two CAs need to communicate with each other
in order to finish key transfer. Thus extra handshakes between
CAs cause tedious key transfer time in the traditional structure.
Handover time cost of the conventional scheme and traditional
structure exceed 10 seconds when transaction number more
than 800 and 1750, respectively. The blockchain scheme costs
much less time. To summarise, blockchain structure has better
scalability performance against the traditional structure in
situation (ii) due to less processing time cost.
D. Blockchain Performace Evaluation
Fig. 10. Average transaction number under different traffic levels
The transaction collection period provides a window to
allow SMs to pick received transactions. Therefore different
period lengths decide the amount of transactions flooding into
SM network. Double-direction highways are considered based
on the assumptions in Fig.6, leading to two traffic flows on
each highway. Therefore we take a single traffic flow as a
standard metric unit and simulate the average transactions in
a single traffic flow. Fig.10 plots the average transactions as a
function of traffic levels and transaction collection periods. We
observe that the transaction number is directly proportional to
the traffic level. Moreover, the longer tCP, the more transac-
tions are caught by SMs. The average number of transactions
per tCP per traffic flow is calculated as follows:
λ = nT/CP =
nH
3600
× tCP
Where nT/CP is the average number of cross-border actions
(transactions) within each tCP and nH is the average number of
vehicles (traffic level) passing a road in each hour. A parameter
nR is multiplied by the nT/CP to get the average transaction
number in all the roads, here nR is the amount of roads that
are taken into calculation.
Fig.11 Illustrates the key transfer performances under var-
ious collection periods. It can be seen that for each value
of collection period, there exists a marked rise trends when
collection period longer than 0.8 seconds. The results indicate
that longer collection period lets SMs to accept much more
transactions, leading to heavy processing burden and tedious
computation time. According to the results in the previous
Fig. 11. Key transfer time under transaction collection periods
figure, for instance, average 4.2 transactions are captured
using 1 second collection period when traffic level is equal to
15000 vehicles/hour/road, while 3.3 transactions are captured
under traffic level of 12000 vehicles/hour/road. This causes
120× (4.2− 3.3) = 108 transactions’ difference, resulting in
huge difference of key transfer time. In addition, the result
of 0.5 to 0.7 seconds increases steadily when other results
increase exponentially.
E. Dynamic Transaction Collection Period
To measure the effect more accurately, we use 1 second as a
standard metric to make sure that every transaction collection
periods have equal running time. In order to confirm the
effectiveness of the dynamic transaction collection period, we
have carried out a simulation experiment to investigate the
average processing time of key transfer in 1 second.
Fig. 12. Key transfer time results measured in one second
The evaluation is done using simulation. The modelling and
parameter settings are discussed in the assumption section.
The running time of simulation is set to be one hour, multiple
key transfer procedures under various collection periods are
recorded and divided by 3600 seconds. Part of the results
of above description are shown in Fig.12(a). Along with
the growth of traffic level, the minimum time results occur
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under different tCP values. Longer transaction collection period
provides shorter key transfer time under mild traffic conditions.
However, rapid collection frequency and shorter collection in-
terval performance better under heavy traffic burden. Fig.12(b)
shows the curve change under our dynamic collection period
scheme. From the figure, it can be seen that the dynamic
scheme always occupies the minimum key transfer time among
results. This is because the optimal choice of collection periods
are computed using Algorithm.3. The algorithm forces SMs
to select a tCP which forces the system to transfer keys with
the minimum time cost.
Fig. 13. Decreased key transfer time in percentage
We further studied the time-saving performance of the
dynamic scheme. Fig.13 plots the average decreased time as a
function of various traffic levels and tCP ranging from 0.5 to
1 second. We observe that under the heavier traffic level, the
more frequently transaction collection, the lower proportion of
decreased time. In contrast, infrequent transaction collection
guides to a larger proportion of decreased time at off-peak
traffic level. Albeit fewer handshakes, longer collection period
takes more than 10% of time cost to finish key transfer
at peak traffic level. Thus, for higher traffic levels, using a
shorter tCP becomes an economic selection to release the
computation burden and improve system efficiency. Shorter
collection period, on the other hand, consumes more time to
transfer transactions at low traffic situations.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel key management scheme
for key transfer among SMs in heterogeneous VCS networks.
Our scheme introduces blockchain concept and optimises the
performance using dynamic transaction collection periods. The
proposed blockchain structure allows key transfer securely
within the decentralised SM network. We developed an effec-
tive and flexible transaction collection period selection method
to shrink the key transfer time of blockchain scheme. Two
components are discussed: blockchain based key management
scheme and dynamic transaction collection scheme. We first
studied cryptographic schemes’ processing time which com-
poses the key transfer time. Secondly, by simulating a range
of 0 to 2000 transactions transfer from one security domain
to another, our blockchain structure achieves more efficiency
and robustness compared to the traditional structure. Finally,
dynamic transaction collection period further optimise the
key transfer time cost. With the help of our mathematical
model, SMs are able to decide how to use different transaction
collection periods. Our work focuses to further take privacy
issues into consideration, including the investigation of a
system which provides both security and privacy. In the future,
the extension of our work aims at pseudonym management
using blockchain basing on the current system. Our future
work aims at pseudonym management using blockchain basing
on the current system. Moreover, users are able to decide the
trade-off between security and privacy.
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